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For	 over	 half	 a	 century,	Daniel	Dennett	 has	
been	 engaged	 in	 the	 grand	 naturalistic	 proj-
ect	 of	 examining	 the	 world	 in	 accordance	
with	scientific	 theory.	His	 latest	book,	From 








ral	 selection.	The	 theory	 states	 that	 changes	
in	a	population	across	generations	result	from	
heritable  variations  in  the  traits  of  members  
of	that	population	differentially	affecting	the	
reproductive	 rates	 of	 these	 members	 of	 the	
population.	With	 regards	 to	 biological	 orga-
nisms,	the	variations	are	partly	due	to	muta-
tions	 in	 genes,	 which	 are	 heritable	 through	
asexual	 and	 sexual	 reproductive	 processes.	
As	we	shall	 see,	 though,	selective	processes	
may	also	apply	to	variations	in	structures	oth-





intelligent	 designer	 but	 instead	 is	 explained	
by	 the	 purposeless	 process	 of	 natural	 selec-
tion.	 Of	 course,	 the	 theory	 of	 evolution	 is	
nowadays	 widely	 accepted,	 and	 we	 widely	
consider	 creationism	 to	 be	 false.	 However,	
Dennett  suggests  that  there  remains  some  
resistance	 to	 applying	 the	 theory	 to	 human	
intellect.	A	central	aim	of	his	book,	then,	is	to	
show	how	the	mystery	of	the	human	intellect	
might	 be	 dispelled	 by	 a	more	 extensive	 ap-
plication	of	the	theory	of	evolution	by	natural	
selection.
The	book	 roughly	 has	 a	 historical	 structure,	
albeit	with	some	digressions.	Beginning	with	
the	world	before	the	appearance	of	life,	Den-
nett	 conjectures	 that	 cyclical	patterns	at	dif-
ferent	 temporal	 scales,	 including	 seasons,	
tides,	night	and	day,	and	the	water	cycle,	may	
have	 resulted	 in	 cumulative	 changes	 in	 the	
earth’s	conditions.	These	conditions,	in	turn,	





discussion	 is	 well	 informed	 and	 has	 prima 
facie	plausibility.	Dennett	then	takes	us	from	
unicellular	 organisms,	 via	 animals,	 to	 the	
achievements	of	humans,	including	language,	
culture,	and	technology.	Finally,	he	reflects	on	
the	 prospects	 of	 intelligent	machines.	 Inter-
estingly,	Dennett	does	not	think	that	the	com-
prehensive	capacities	of	machines	are	on	the	










accessible	 despite	 also	 being	 technical.	 Al-
















enced	 by	 historical	 limitations,	morphologi-
cal	constraints,	and	developmental	contingen-
cies.	Dennett	has	little	time	for	these	critics	in	




differential	 survival,	 and	 imperfect	 replica-




process.	Therefore,	what	 turns	out	 to	be	 the	
case	a posteriori	may	not	be	what	is	a priori 
expected	by	the	algorithm.
Occasionally,	Dennett	seems	to	prioritise	this	
sort	 of	 algorithmic	 reasoning	 over	 the	 em-
pirical	 detail.	 An	 example	 is	 his	 peculiarly	












evaluating	 and	males	 that	 do	 the	 strutting”.	














of	 sexual	 behaviour.	 The	 relations	 between	
the	 sexes	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 much	 more	 di-
verse	and	flexible	 than	the	behavioural	roles	
that  Dennett  derives  through  adaptationist  
reasoning.	 So	 they	 are	 better	 understood	 by	
examining	the	actual	conditions	and	contexts	
that	 contributed	 to	 their	manifestations	 than	
by	committing	to	what	might	seem	to	follow	
from an algorithm.
Further	 to	 the	 theory	 of	 evolution,	 Dennett	
suggests	 that	 another	 “strange	 inversion	 of	
reasoning”	 is	 presented	 by	 Alan	 Turing’s	
creation	of	 the	 computer,	which	 shows	how	
a	system	can	perform	arithmetic	without	nec-
essarily	having	to	comprehend	what	arithme-
tic	 is.	 Hence,	 an	 expression	 that	 frequently	
appears	 in	 the	book	 is	 “competence	without	
comprehension”.	This	is	the	notion	that	most	
of  the  things  that  organisms  do  to  thrive  in  
the	world	and	cope	with	one	another	are	not	
comprehended	 by	 them,	 but	 are	 performed	
unthinkingly.	 According	 to	 Dennett,	 there	
are	reasons	why	these	behavioural	processes	
developed,	 which	 are	 to	 do	 with	 the	 pres-
sures	 of	 natural	 selection,	 but	 the	 organ-
isms  themselves  do  not  have  those  reasons.  
He	uses	 the	example	of	 an	antelope	 leaping	
high	 in	 the	 air	 during	 its	 attempt	 to	 escape	
a	predator,	a	behaviour	known	as	stotting.	A	
suggested	evolutionary	reason	for	stotting	 is	









Dennett	 suggests	 that	 comprehension	 com-
plements	 competence	 only	 after	 the	 appear-
ance	of	 human	 reflective	 thought.	However,	
it	could	be	objected	that	the	account	of	com-
prehension	he	assumes	 is	 too	narrow.	 In	 the	
above	animal	example,	it	is	possible	to	accept	
the	 evolutionary	 reason	 for	 stotting	 without	
denying	 that	 the	 instantiation	 of	 this	 behav-
iour	involves	some	degree	of	comprehension.	
Of	course,	it	would	be	anthropomorphism	to	
suggest	 that	 the	 antelope	 comprehends	 the	
fitness	 signalling	 effect	 of	 stotting	 and	 me-
thodically	 uses	 this	 comprehension	 to	 deter	
the	 predator.	 Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 plausible	 to	
say	 that	 the	 antelope	 at	 least	 comprehends	
the threat that the predator poses and that this 
comprehension	 motivates	 behaviour	 which	













memes	 can	 undergo	 variations	 as	 they	 are	








established	 in	 societies,	 and	 the	 traditional	
festivals	that	were	celebrated	for	centuries.
In	 some	 respect,	 Dennett’s	 support	 for	 the	
meme	 is	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 increas-
ing	recognition	in	the	philosophy	of	biology	






phasises	 how	 social	 patterns,	 environmental	
conditions,	and	epigenetic	resources	can	also	
exhibit	 the	 high	 levels	 of	 copying	 fidelity	
and	stability	 that	are	 traditionally	associated	
with	 genes.	 Thus,	 we	 tend	 to	 resemble	 and	
behave	 like	our	parents	not	 just	because	we	
share	 their	 genes,	 but	 also	because	many	of	
the	material	 resources,	 styles	 of	 interacting,	
and	 social	 conditions	are	passed	on,	 copied,	
and	 reconstructed	 across	 generations.	 In	 an-
other	 respect,	 however,	 Dennett’s	 focus	 in	














and	 dedicates	 a	 chapter	 to	 addressing	 some	
objections.	These	include	the	objections	that	
cultural	changes	do	not	occur	in	discrete	units,	
that memes do not have properties analogous 
to	alleles,	that	memes	are	not	predictive,	and	
that	memes	are	not	explanatory.	The	last	ob-
jection	 deserves	 more	 attention,	 as	 it	 casts	
serious	 doubt	 on	 the	 epistemic	 value	 of	 the	
memetic	approach.	To	give	his	approach	wide	
scope,	 Dennett	 greatly	 expands	 the	 concept	















about	 explanatory	 value.	 As	 a	 conciliatory	








A	 further	 disanalogy	 between	 cultural	 evo-
lution	and	biological	 evolution	concerns	 the	
much	greater	 role	of	 intention	 in	 the	 former	
than	 in	 the	 latter.	 Dennett	 wants	 to	 suggest	
that	much	 cultural	 evolution,	 like	biological	
evolution,	proceeds	via	a	purposeless	process	
of	 natural	 selection,	 but	 he	 is	 not	 entirely	
clear	 which	 cultural	 items	 he	 considers	 to	
be	selected	purposelessly.	Quite	often,	 intel-




purposefully	 think	 about	 the	 visual,	 literary,	
and	narrative	features	that	are	likely	to	make	
it	 appealing.	 The	 author	 may	 also	 purpose-
fully	increase	its	popularity	through	judicious	
advertising.	 Of	 course,	 we	 can	 accept	 the	





the	 story’s	 popularity.	 The	 relation	 between	
intending	 to	write	 a	bestseller	 and	writing	a	
bestseller	 is	 not	merely	 coincidental.	 In	 this	
respect,	 cultural	 evolution	 is	more	 like	 arti-
ficial	 selection	 or	 genetic	 modification	 than	
natural	 selection.	 The	 trouble	 with	 the	 me-
metic	approach,	then,	is	that	it	underplays	the	
role	 of	 comprehension	 in	 cultural	 progress.	
Purposeless	processes	can	affect	how	cultural	
features  spread,  but  purposeful  insights  are  
often	significant	influences	as	well.
This	 brings	 us	 to	 the	 part	 of	 the	 book	with	
which	 Dennett’s	 critics	 would	 perhaps	 dis-
agree	 most,	 namely	 his	 discussion	 of	 con-
sciousness.	 In	 the	penultimate	chapter,	Den-
nett	 suggests	 that	 conscious	 experience	 is	 a	
useful	illusion,	much	like	the	image	projected	
by	a	computer	screen.	This	is	a	claim	which	
Keith	Frankish	has	 recently	 termed	 illusion-
ism.	 Philosophers	 critical	 of	Dennett’s	 view	





conscious	experience	 is	 real.	Accordingly,	 it	
is	nonsensical	to	claim	that	conscious	experi-
ence	 itself	 is	 an	 illusion	because	 an	 illusion	
presupposes	 the	 reality	 of	 conscious	 experi-
ence.	 This	 recalls	 René	 Descartes’	 famous	
argument	 that	 I	 cannot	 doubt	 the	 existence	
of	myself	as	a	first-person	conscious	subject,	
because	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 exist	 necessarily	 fol-
lows	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 doubt.	 Likewise,	







wants	 to	 claim	 that	my	first-person	 point	 of	
view	of	my	own	mind	may	not	be	so	differ-
ent	 from	my	 second-person	 observations	 of	
others’	minds,	 inasmuch	as	 I	neither	 see	 the	
complicated	neural	processes	in	my	brain	nor	
in	others’	brains,	but	 the	very	fact	 that	 there	
is	 such	 a	 first-person	 point	 of	 view	 entails	
the	 reality	 of	 subjective	 experience.	Knowl-
edge	of	consciousness,	then,	marks	the	point	
at	 which	 scepticism	 becomes	 false	 because	
the	existence	of	consciousness	is	a	necessary	
condition	 of	 possibility	 for	 any	 appearance,	
illusory	or	otherwise.
For	many	of	Dennett’s	critics,	this	marks	the	




the	 issue	 is	 partly	 conceptual	 and	 that	 he	 is	
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neglecting	 to	 use	 the	meaning	of	 conscious-
ness	as	 it	 is	usually	understood	 in	 the	philo-
sophical	 community.	 Nonetheless,	 there	 is	
no	need	for	Dennett	to	try	to	turn	his	back	on	


























about	 natural	 history	 while	 conceding	 that	
phenomenality	 may	 require	 a	 different	 sort	
of	 account.	And	 so,	 Dennett’s	 disinclination	
to	 admit	 the	 reality	 of	 whatever	 eludes	 his	
reductive	 net	 raises	 doubt	 about	whether	 he	
has	heeded	his	own	warning	against	“greedy”	
reductionism.
In	 the	 final	 chapter,	 Dennett	 considers	 the	
question	of	what	 is	 the	value	of	comprehen-




and	 many	 philosophers	 may	 be	 inclined	 to	




self	states	 that	he	finds	 comprehension	 to	be	
“one	of	life’s	greatest	thrills”,	but	his	defence	
of	 comprehension	 is	 largely	 instrumental.	
He	 reflects	 on	 how	we	 rely	 unthinkingly	 on	
technological	 artefacts	 for	 everyday	 tasks,	
such	as	 satellite	navigation	 systems	 to	 reach	












explicitly	 mentioned	 by	 Dennett,	 but	 which	
reinforces	 his	 defence	 of	 the	 instrumental	
value	of	comprehension.	This	is	the	example	
of	anthropogenic	climate	change.	Throughout	
the	 history	 of	 civilisation,	 we	 have	 compe-
tently	 manipulated	 environmental	 resources	
in	various	ways	 that	have	 increased	our	sur-
vival	 prospects	 and	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	
rapid	 proliferation	 of	 our	 species	 across	 the	
planet.	 Among	 other	 things,	 these	 include	
the	 intensive	 farming	 of	 livestock,	 the	 com-
bustion	 of	 fossil	 fuel,	 and	 the	 inexpensive	




due	 to	 selective	pressures,	 insofar	 as	 the	 so-
cieties	 that	 took	them	up	had	higher	rates	of	
production	 that	 could	 support	 larger	 popula-
tions.	 However,	 comprehension	 is	 showing	
that	competence	can	only	go	so	far.	It	is	now	
scientifically	 established	 that	 anthropogenic	
climate	change	is	happening	because	we	have	
been	 so	 competent	 at	manipulating	 environ-
mental	resources	in	these	ways.	We	know	that	
such	practices,	which	may	initially	have	been	
advantageous for the proliferation of our spe-
cies,	 are	 now	 severely	 harming	 the	 welfare	
and	survival	prospects	of	 future	generations.	
And	 so,	 to	 continue	 down	 the	 path	 of	mere	
competence	 would	 be	 calamitous.	 Only	 by	
comprehending	the	implications	of	our	prac-
tices	can	we	become	able	and	inspired	to	curb	
our	 entrenched	 proclivities	 and	 manage	 our	
destinies	differently.
While	 we	 may	 not	 agree	 with	 all	 that	 is	
claimed	in	this	book,	From Bacteria to Bach 
and Back: The Evolution of Minds  is a valu-
able	contribution	to	 the	 literature.	Dennett	 is	
excellent	 at	 communicating	 complex	 topics	
and	 his	 conjectures	 are	 always	 captivating.	
Readers	would	do	well	 to	note	 that	many	of	
these	 conjectures	 reflect	 his	 prior	 theoretical	
assumptions	rather	than	established	scientific	
facts.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 points	 he	 raises	 will	
certainly	 motivate	 philosophers	 to	 advance	
these	discussions	further	with	fresh	arguments	
and novel theories.
Hane Htut Maung
